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Does Workforce Participation Empower Women?  
Micro-Level Evidence from Urban Bangladesh 
 
Abstract 
Empirical studies on the impact of women’s paid jobs on their empowerment and welfare in 
the Bangladesh context are rare. The few studies on the issue to date have all been confined 
to the garment workers only although studies indicate that women’s workforce participation 
in Bangladesh has increased across-the-board. Besides, none of these studies has made an 
attempt to control for the non-working women and/or applied any statistical technique to 
control for the effects of other pertinent determinants of women’s empowerment and welfare 
such as education, age, religion and place of living. This study overcomes these drawbacks 
and presents alternative assessments of the link between women’s workforce participation 
and empowerment on the basis of survey data from the two largest cities in Bangladesh. 
While the generic assessment indicates that women’s paid jobs have positive implications for 
women’s participation in decisions on fertility, children’s education and healthcare as well as 
their possession and control of resources, the econometric assessment negates most of these 
observations. Women’s education, on the other hand, appears to be more important than their 
participation in the labour force. The study underlines the fact that by omitting other relevant 
explanatory variables from the analysis, the previous studies might have overestimated the 
impact of women’s paid work on their empowerment. Among other things, the paper also 
highlights the importance of women’s job category, religion and regional differences for 
women’s empowerment.  
 
Does Workforce Participation Empower Women?  
Micro-Level Evidence from Urban Bangladesh 
 
1. Introduction 
Women’s empowerment has been a topic of academic and policy discussions and debates for 
quite a long time now. Sidelined as a ‘special’ topic until the mid-1980s (Mason, 1986), the 
issue has recently earned a place in the mainstream theories of the social sciences as well as 
the feminist schools of thought. Despite the universality of the concept, attention to women’s 
empowerment appears to have been pronounced more in the context of the developing 
countries than the developed countries. Understandably, in recent years the policy advocacies 
of various international organisations to the developing countries have explicitly underlined 
the importance women’s empowerment. For instance, the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration (2000) emphasises the ‘centrality’ of women in the development process. The 
UN Declaration identifies women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality as the 
key factors for reduction of poverty, hunger and diseases and for prompting sustainable 
development (WEDO, undated). The existence of huge number of non-government 
organisations (NGOs) in developing countries like Bangladesh and their similar modus 
operandi that target poverty alleviation through distribution of micro-credit among women 
are recognition of the perception that such measures do raise women’s status. 
 
While there is consensus on the importance of women’s empowerment, the literature has yet 
to come up with a precise definition of the term. Likewise, there is no unique set of indicators 
that can be used to judge improvements or deteriorations in women’s empowerment. 
Consequently, the concept has been incarnated as being ‘fuzzy’ or ‘elusive’ or, at best, ‘ill-
defined’ (Kabeer, 1999; Mason, 1986; Dixon, 1978). In essence, women’s empowerment is a 
multi-dimensional concept that embraces a wide range of factors such as social customs, 
cultures and mores, religion, caste, family type and ‘locations’, among other things, which 
may not be amenable to any ‘objective’ scale of measurement. Empirical studies suggest that 
location and regional differences which also embody traditions, cultures and customs, and 
religion have great but asymmetrical implications for women’s empowerment (Roy and 
Niranjan, 2004; Safilios-Rothschild, 1980; Whyte, 1978). The lack of clarity about the 
concept notwithstanding, gender inequality or its correlate ‘power’ is considered central to 
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the analysis of women’s empowerment (Kabeer, 1999; Rowlands, 1997). Accordingly, 
women’s empowerment is tentatively defined as the transformation of the power relations 
between men and women at the individual, household, society as well as the national levels 
(IUSSP, 1997). At the macro level, among other indicators, women’s empowerment, or lack 
of it, is identified with gender inequality in employment, earnings, education, life expectancy, 
and female-male ratio in the population. These indicators, though they fail to capture the full 
connotation of the term, are frequently mentioned in the literature as the proxy or indirect 
indicators of women’s empowerment (Joshi, 1999). At the household level, women’s 
empowerment is equated with their involvement in decision-making such as decisions on 
fertility, children’s education and healthcare and marriage, and women’s freedom of mobility 
and access to and control of resources that are interpreted as the direct indicators of 
empowerment. Despite the multidimensionality of the concept, these direct indicators are 
thought to be correlated regardless of locations as well as cultural and religious orientations 
(Jejeebhoy, 1998).  
Although improvements in gender inequality in terms of employment, earnings, education 
and other indirect indicators do not by themselves imply a simultaneous improvement in 
women’s empowerment at the household level, women’s participation in paid jobs in 
particular is viewed as an important determinant of their individual choices (Joekes, 1987; 
Lim, 1990). Some models of the economics of family (e.g., Sen, 1990; Schultz, 1990), as 
detailed in the next section, also subscribe to this view. Women’s empowerment at the 
household level is ultimately an empirical issue that calls for a careful assessment of 
women’s own views on relevant facts. While numerous studies have examined the link 
between women’s workforce participation and fertility both at micro and macro levels, 
empirical research on women’s empowerment per se has so far been scarce (Roy and 
Niranjan, 2004).  
 
The present study takes Bangladesh as a case study and, on the basis of survey data1 (a brief 
profile of the data is given in table 1 below), examines the standing of working women vis-à-
vis non-working women, particularly working vs. non-working married women with respect 
to the following issues: (a) fertility decisions; (b) decisions on children’s education and 
medical treatment; (c) possession of assets and control over earnings; (d) freedom of 
movement and the rights to associate; (e) incidence of domestic violence; and (f) women’s 
overall status in the family (including the possibility of enforcing a decision to divorce the 
husband), among their relatives as well as in the society, and their welfare as they view them. 
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The study also sheds light on the extent of gender earnings inequality and harassment at the 
workplace. Furthermore, the study makes a comparison of the control over earnings between 
married and single working women. Last of all, the study compares the views of the working 
and non-working women on the issues of family restrictions on their movement, and whether 
these restrictions are a kind of gender discrimination and therefore should be removed or else 
the restrictions are out of affection and concern for their own welfare as well as the welfare of 
the whole family. After a generic evaluation of the issues, the paper then employs the non-
parametric chi-square test to check if statistically significant differences exist between the 
working and the non-working women with respect to relevant attributes. This is followed by 
an estimation of a set of logistic regression models whereby the impact of women’s 
workforce participation has been examined by controlling for the effect of other explanatory 
variables such as education, age, religion, region and husband’s status of employment. The 
regression models have been further extended to allow for and examine the effects of 
women’s as well as husband’s job category in terms of skills.  
Table 1: 
Brief profile of the respondents 
Attribute No. of Respondents 
(Percentage) 
Attribute No. of 
Respondents 
(Percentage) 
Education Labour Force Participation 
Illiterate 54 (11.54) Non-Participation 112 (24.56) 
Primary 62 (13.60) Participation 444 (75.44) 
Low Secondary 19 (19.74) Self-Employment 50 (10.96) 
Secondary & Upper 
Secondary 
136 (29.82) Low-Skill Employment 111 (24.34) 
University Degree 114 (25.00) Medium-Skill Employment 111 (24.34) 
Religion High-Skill Employment 72 (15.79) 
Muslim 404 (88.60) Women’s Monthly Income (in Taka) 
Non-Muslim 52 (11.40) Less than 1,000 232 (50.88) 
Age 1,000 to 5,000 94 (20.61) 
15 Years or Less 9 (1.42) 6,000 to 10,000 84 (18.42) 
16 to 20 Years 49 (5.67) 11,000 to 15,000 25 (5.48) 
21 to 25 Years 90 (15.01) 16,000 to 20,000 11 (2.41) 
26 to 30 Years 109 (26.91) 20,000 & Above 10 (2.19) 
31 to 35 Years 85 (21.25) Regions 
36 to 40 Years 52 (14.45) Dhaka 276 (60.53) 
41 and Above 52 (15.30) Chittagong 180 (39.47) 
Source: Field survey. Definitions of variables: Illiterate = never attended school; Primary = 1 to 5 years of 
schooling; Low secondary = 6 to 8 years of schooling; Secondary and higher Secondary = 10 to 13 
years of schooling; University degree = 14 or more years of schooling. 
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It may be noted here that the issue of women’s paid jobs and empowerment in the 
Bangladesh context has not so far been adequately researched. The few studies of the topic, 
as discussed in Section 3, have all concentrated on the empowerment of a particular type of 
paid jobs, that is, the garment workers. At the same time, these studies suffer from 
methodological inadequacies as they fail to apply any appropriate empirical technique to 
account for the effects of other variables such as age, education and religion as well as to 
allow, as a control, for the situation of non-working women. The present study overcomes 
these drawbacks and is, to our knowledge, the first micro-level study on Bangladesh to 
consider a wide range of paid jobs as well as the job classifications of wives and husbands 
based on their skill-differences. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
briefly reviews the theoretical premises underpinning the relationship between women’s 
workforce participation and their empowerment. Section 3 summarises relevant past 
empirical studies for Bangladesh. Sections 4 to 8 present a generic assessment of the results. 
Section 9 outlines the empirical results based on the chi-square tests and the logistic 
regressions. The concluding remarks are given in Section 10.  
 
2. A Brief Review of the Theory 
In social demography, women’s workforce participation or earnings is believed to have a 
negative impact on fertility (see, for example, Lim, 2002; Mason, 1986). Limiting fertility by 
the couples per se does not imply women’s freedom from the control of male-family 
members. Women’s workforce participation in this context has rather more implications for 
the family budget than for women’s household decision-making power and/or control over 
resources (Mason, 1986). Similar views are expressed in the altruistic models, more 
specifically the unitary models, of the New Home Economics or the neoclassical economics 
of family (Becker, 1960, 1981; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Willis, 1973; Cigno, 1991). The 
unitary models assume that the members of the household maximise a joint utility function 
through its decisions on labour supply and allocation of resources within the household 
subject to an aggregate budget constraint. Implicit to these models is the assumption of the 
existence of a ‘unique’ aggregate consumption good which is distributed either according to 
an altruistic consensus within the household or the preference of the head or a designated 
member of the family who would play the role of a benevolent dictator. However, critics of 
this approach suggest that the supposed altruists in effect have the supreme decision-making 
authority (Ben-Porath, 1982) and, therefore, the ability to “freely modify their transfers in 
response to the other person’s decisions” (Chiappori, 1992, p. 442). Furthermore, as Manser 
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and Brown (1980) suggest, the Beckerian unitary model can be interpreted to have introduced 
a ‘de facto bargaining rule’ which is the maximisation of the altruistic member’s utility. 
Hence, women’s workforce participation or earnings in this model only contributes to their 
share of household resources rather than their decision-making power (Kabeer, 1997) unless 
of course the concerned women themselves happen to be the so called altruistic members of 
the family. On a different note, unitary approach, as pointed out in the quantity-quality 
model, posits a negative relationship between women’s workforce participation and fertility 
(Becker and Lewis, 1973; Willis, 1973). But the purported relationship is more of a by-
product of the process of maximising the household utility function whereby labor supply and 
child-rearing compete for women’s allotted time rather than women’s ability to take fertility 
decisions. 
 
While the unitary theories do not give a clear indication on the relationship between women’s 
labour force participation and empowerment, some rival theories of the economics of family 
do indeed explicitly hypothesise a link between women’s workforce participation and their 
involvement in household decisions and/or control over resources. These include the 
endowment and entitlements theory, the bargaining theory and the cooperative conflict 
theory. It must be pointed out though that all of these theories may have underestimated the 
importance of culture and custom or social effects in modifying behaviour. Sen’s (Sen, 1981) 
entitlements theory emphasises the institutional factors in decision-making and identifies 
possession, use and exchange of resources as indicators of women’s status. Women’s 
workforce participation endows them with resources and an a priori command over resources 
which in turn can potentially raise their status. In the game-theoretic bargaining models (Ben-
Porath, 1982; Schultz, 1990; Alderman, et al., 1995; Haddad et al., 1997), family members 
are assumed to have diverse and conflicting preferences. The degree of one’s involvement in 
decision-making will depend on his/her relative bargaining or ‘threat’ power. Relative 
earnings or wealth alongside some ‘extra-environmental’ parameters such as sex ratios in the 
relevant marriage markets, child support settlements laws and cultural acceptability of outside 
work can strengthen women’s ability to negotiate and bargain at the household level 
(McElroy, 1990). In the cooperative conflict model (Sen, 1990), women’s bargaining power 
and, therefore, their entitlement to the household resources are assumed to be determined by 
both economic and extra environmental factors. A member’s bargaining power is positively 
related to his/her ‘perceived’, as opposed to ‘actual’, economic contribution to the well-being 
of the household. Thus, production for market exchange, cash earnings and earnings outside 
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home are regarded more important than production for subsistence consumption, earnings in 
kind and earnings through activities conducted at home respectively. A member can also 
exert superior bargaining power through threat or violence. A third element in Sen’s theory is 
the ‘perceived interest response’ according to which a member may accept his/her present 
inferior or subordinated position in the family in anticipation of a better future. The 
distinction between personal well-being and perceived interest implies, unlike the unitary 
models, the existence of multiple utility functions within the household (Kabeer, 1997).  
 
In essence, the bargaining theories, including the cooperative conflict theory, provide an 
operational framework for the analysis of women’s workforce participation and 
empowerment. As Kabeer (1997: p.264) puts it, “...other things being equal, women’s access 
to waged employment constitutes a sufficient condition for an improvement in their 
bargaining position within the household because it improves their breakdown position, 
enhances their perceived contributions to the household and is likely to realign their 
perceived interests more closely with their personal well-being”.  
 
3. The Bangladesh Context and the Past Empirics 
In Bangladesh, like many other developing countries, traditionally there has been an obvious 
division of labour between women and men at the household level. Men are presumed to be 
responsible for earning the living for the family while women will take care of the household 
activities including child-bearing. In a country like Bangladesh where employment and 
earning opportunities are seriously limited and mostly involve hard physical work in 
agriculture or manufacturing, the latter typically requires staying away from home, this 
division of labour apparently accords with the doctrine of the comparative advantage. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued from observation and empirical evidence that women often 
work longer hours than men when they are not formally employed, or find themselves 
serving the “double shift” when they are formally employed. Men’s role being more visible 
earns them the recognition of being the catalysts of family welfare, which lays a fine line of 
demarcation between the perceived status of women and men in the society against women. 
 
Over the last two decades, the scenario has changed considerably as women involved 
themselves in income-generating activities both within and outside home on an increasing 
scale. The two factors that contributed most to this transition are: the spread of the 
microfinance endeavour of various NGOs and similar organisations to rural and urban poor 
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women and the expansion of the low-skill export oriented textiles and garment industries. 
Currently, more than 3,000 NGOs of different sises work in Bangladesh, which include the 
much heralded Grameen Bank, the BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) and 
Save the Children. The Grameen Bank and BRAC had a combined membership of about 6.0 
million as of 2002, of which more than 95 per cent were females (Hossain and Tisdell, 2005). 
Similarly, about 1.8 million workers were employed in the readymade garment sector of 
which more that 90 per cent were women (Shefali, 2002).  
 
Past empirical studies on women’s empowerment in Bangladesh thus not surprisingly 
surrounded the micro-credit recipients and the garment workers. Studies on the impact of 
women’s participation in the NGO-sponsored rural credit and/or other forms of women 
development programs suggest that in general the NGO-membership improves gender 
inequality in terms of involvement in household decisions and mobility (Hashemi et al., 
1996; Amin and Pebley, 1994; Naved, 1994). However, as Amin and Pebley (1994) point 
out, the indicators of women’s status do not display any considerable degrees of differences 
across the program participants and the non-participants and that the syndromes of 
empowerment are apparent only in the longer term. While these studies provide useful 
insights, it is hard to decisively infer a link between women’s workforce participation and 
their empowerment as women often fail to distinguish between their household and income-
earning activities. 
 
Empirical studies on garment workers also bring out similar findings (Zohir, 2001; Zaman, 
2001; Kabeer, 1997). But that has been probably at the expense of their health and increased 
risk of harassment (Paul-Majumder, 1996; Paul-Majumder and Johir, 1994) which clearly 
counterbalances the welfare gains through enhanced decision-making power, freedom of 
movement as well as control over resources, if any. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
findings of these studies are seriously limited by their methodological inadequacies. First, 
these studies simply reproduce the views of a ‘category’ of respondents through ‘narratives’ 
and/or percentages without controlling for the effects of other factors or attributes such as 
level of education, place of living, age and religion. The inclusion of these pertinent variables 
would call for the application of an appropriate econometric or statistical technique. 
Secondly, these studies do not indicate how the alleged empowerment of paid workers differs 
from that of the non-working women. The present study addresses both these issues and at 
the same time aims at bringing about a more comprehensive picture about women’s 
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empowerment in Bangladesh by including in the sample, cross sections of working women. 
This issue is important in view of the empirical evidence that women’s workforce 
participation in Bangladesh has also increased, albeit slowly, in high-skill and decision-
making jobs. 
 
4. Women’s Participation in Family Decisions 
Decisions on fertility and children’s education and healthcare are some of the important 
decisions taken at the family level. Tables 2 to 4 present the sources of decisions on these 
issues by status of women’s employment and their branches of economic activity as 
percentage of the number of respondents in each category. Table 2 shows that employed 
women have greater autonomy in fertility decisions than the unemployed. Only 5.36 per cent 
of the unemployed married women have taken independent fertility decisions against about 
10 per cent of the employed women. In 21.43 per cent of the cases of unemployed women, 
fertility decisions are taken solely by the husbands compared to the 10.37 per cent of the 
working women. However, for both categories, fertility decisions are mostly taken jointly by 
the husband and wife (73.44 per cent of the employed and 70.53 per cent of the unemployed). 
Alternatively, more than 83 per cent of employed women (independent plus joint categories) 
have had their say on fertility in comparison with about 76 per cent of the non-working 
women. Thus, ceteris paribus, a working woman has a greater participation in fertility 
decisions than the non-working women. Among the working women, those who are 
employed in high-skill jobs have marginally greater participation in fertility decisions 
compared to the other skill-groups as can be seen from Table 2. 
 
Table 2: 
Fertility decisions in urban Bangladesh by status of employment (%) 
Source of Fertility Decision  
Women’s Employment Status Wife Husband Joint Others 
Unemployed (112)   5.36 21.43 70.53 2.63 
Employed (241)   9.96 10.37 73.44 6.22 
Self-employed (44)   9.09 13.64 72.73 4.55 
Low-skill employment (74)   8.11 10.81 75.63 5.41 
Medium-skill employment (61) 11.48 11.48 70.49 6.66 
High-skill employment (62) 11.29   6.45 74.19 8.06 
Overall (353)   8.49 13.88 72.52 5.10 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: Figures in brackets denote the numbers of respondents. 
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Working women also participate in greater proportions in decisions on children’s education 
relative to the non-working women. As presented in table 3, other things remaining the same, 
about 15 per cent of the working women take independent decisions on children’s education 
compared to 10 per cent of the non-working women. Similarly, a working woman has just 
over a four per cent greater chance of having an opinion on children’s education. Women’s 
branches of economic activity do not appear to make any perceptible difference. 
 
Table 3: 
Decisions on children’s education by status of employment (%) 
Source of Decision on Children’s Education  
Women’s Employment Status Wife Husband Joint Others 
Unemployed (60) 10.00 21.67 66.67 1.67 
Employed (122) 14.75 17.21 66.39 1.63 
Self-employed (16) 18.75 25.00 56.25 0.00 
Low-skill employment (37) 13.51 16.21 67.57 2.70 
Medium-skill employment (33) 15.15 18.18 66.67 0.00 
High-skill employment (36) 13.89 13.89 69.44 2.78 
Overall (182) 13.19 18.68 66.48 1.65 
Source: Field survey.   
Note: As in Table 2. 
 
As regards decisions on children’s healthcare, working women’s participation is 
overwhelmingly greater than the non-working women (see table 4). About one in every four 
working women takes independent decisions on children’s medical care. This is about double 
the proportion of the non-working women. In all, about 88 per cent of the employed women 
participate in decisions on children’s medical needs compared to about 69 per cent of the 
unemployed women. While the overall participation rates for various categories of the 
employed women do not differ much, there is some variability in the proportion of women 
taking independent decisions. And, for all categories of employment, wife’s opinion is more 
likely to prevail that of the husband. The situation is reversed for the unemployed women.  
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 Table 4: 
Decisions on children’s Medicare by status of employment (%) 
Source of Decision on Children’s Education  
Women’s Employment Status Wife Husband Joint Others 
Unemployed (103) 11.65 28.16 57.28 2.91 
Employed (186) 23.66   8.60 63.98 3.76 
Self-employed (29) 31.03   6.90 58.62 3.45 
Low-skill employment (58) 22.41   3.45 67.24 6.90 
Medium-skill employment (47) 27.66 12.77 57.45 2.13 
High-skill employment (52) 17.31 11.54 69.23 1.92 
Overall (289) 19.38 15.57 61.59 3.46 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
 
5. Possession of Assets and Control over Earnings 
The respondents were asked if they owned any property or asset(s) in the form of a plot of 
land, jewellery, money (in cash or at bank or lent for earning interests), rental houses and 
savings certificates. A complete account of women’s possession of the different types of 
assets is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on whether a woman does at all 
own any property or asset and whether an employed woman is more likely to own them than 
an unemployed woman. As presented in table 5, 58.12 per cent of the working women 
(including single women) own some form of asset or property as against 47.32 of the non-
working women. The ratio is even higher for working married women, just over 63 per cent. 
The ratio of working single women possessing an asset, on the other hand, is quite 
comparable with that of the unemployed. Not surprisingly though, women employed in 
higher-skill jobs, thereby earning more, have even greater chances of possessing assets.  
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 Table 5: 
Possession of assets by status of employment (%) 
Women’s Employment Status Yes No 
Unemployed (112) 47.32 52.68 
Employed (344) 58.14 41.86 
Self-employed (47) 55.32 44.68 
Low-skill employment (124) 45.16 54.84 
Medium-skill employment (96) 65.63 34.38 
High-skill employment (77) 71.43 28.57 
Employed and Married (241) 63.07 36.93 
Employed and Single (103) 46.60 53.40 
Overall (456) 55.48 44.52 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
 
Although some women own property or assets such as a plot of land and fixed deposits that 
can generate income, jewellery is the most common form of asset that women hold, which is 
followed by money in cash or at bank. Traditionally, jewellery has been regarded as a proud 
possession of women, especially of married women, in Bangladesh. However, ornaments 
earn nothing except for the fact that they can be exchanged for money in times of need. 
Insufficient data on women’s property incomes render it impossible to make a meaningful 
comparison of the control of earnings between unemployed and employed women. However, 
the proportion of working women making independent decisions on their earnings should 
provide an indication of the degree of women’s control over resources (see table 6). Since the 
parameters determining spending decisions of married and single women are not the same, 
they are treated separately. 
 
Table 6 shows that about 42 per cent of the married working women have absolute control 
over their earnings while another 44 per cent make spending decisions jointly with their 
husbands. The degree of control over earnings is greater for the higher-skill women than the 
low-skill or self-employed women. Single women, on the whole, appear to have greater 
control over their earnings than the married women. 
11 
 Table 6: 
Spending decisions by working women by job category and marital status (%) 
Job Category Married Women Single Women 
 Wife Husband Joint Others Self Parents Joint Others 
Self-Employed 40.91 18.18 34.09 6.82 66.67 33.33 0.00 0.00 
Low-Skill 35.14   6.76 51.35 6.75 48.00 12.00 40.00 0.00 
Medium-Skill 47.54   9.84 40.98 1.64 51.43 14.29 34.29 0.00 
High-Skill 45.16   9.68 45.16 0.00 60.00 13.33 26.67 0.00 
Overall 41.91 10.37 43.98 3.73 51.46 13.59 34.95 0.00 
Source: Field survey.  
Note: Numbers of married women in self-employment, low-, medium- and high-skill categories are 
respectively 44, 74, 61 and 62. The corresponding numbers of single women are 3, 50, 35 and 15 
respectively. Total number of married women is 241 and that of single women is 103. 
 
6. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Associate 
Working women enjoy greater degree of freedom of movement, involve themselves more in 
group activities and are subject to lesser amount of domestic violence. As can be seen from 
table 7, about 64 per cent of the non-working women require to take permission from the 
head of the family, or husband, for participation in outside activities such as shopping, going 
to cinemas and carrying out group activities compared to about 52 per cent of the working 
women. About 20 per cent of the working women hold memberships of formal organisations, 
groups or societies in comparison with about 13 per cent of the non-working women. 
Similarly, the incidence of domestic harassment or violence is about seven per cent lower for 
the employed women than the unemployed. 
 
Table 7: 
Family restrictions on women’s movement, membership of formal organisations  
and occurrence of domestic violence by status of employment (%) 
Family Restrictions Membership Domestic Violence  
Employment Status Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Unemployed (112) 64.29 35.71 13.39 86.61 21.43 78.57 
Employed (344) 52.32 47.67 20.06 79.94 13.66 86.34 
Self-employed (47) 44.68 52.32 14.89 85.11   8.51 91.49 
Low-skill (124) 54.03 45.97 16.94 83.06 16.13 83.87 
Medium-skill (96) 56.25 43.75 23.96 76.04 12.50 87.50 
High-skill (77) 49.35 50.65 23.38 76.62 14.29 85.79 
Overall (456) 55.26 44.74 18.42 81.58 15.57 84.43 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
12 
 Although the majority of the women face restrictions on their movements, only about one in 
four women (23.90 per cent to be precise) considers the restrictions as a kind of gender 
discrimination and about the same proportion of women (24.78 per cent) would like to have 
the restrictions removed (see table 8). Of course, a greater percentage of working women than 
the non-working women view the restrictions as an indication of gender discrimination and 
ask for their removal. 
 
Table 8: 
Whether restrictions on movement are a kind of gender discrimination 
and whether restrictions should be removed 
On Discrimination On Removal of Restrictions  
Employment Status Yes No No Response Yes No No Response 
Unemployed (112) 18.75 59.82 21.43 17.86 51.78 30.36 
Employed (344) 25.58 62.21 12.21 27.03 60.17 12.79 
Self-employed (47) 34.04 55.32 10.64 36.17 51.06 12.77 
Low-skill (124) 18.55 66.94 14.52 20.16 65.32 14.52 
Medium-skill (96) 30.21 63.54   6.25 32.29 60.42   7.29 
High-skill (77) 25.97 57.14 16.88 25.97 57.14 16.88 
Overall (456) 23.90 61.62 14.47 24.78 58.11 17.11 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
 
As shown in table 9, most (about 70 per cent) of the women who do not consider family 
restrictions as gender discrimination regard them as a manifestation of affection from the 
elders or head of the family. About 42 per cent of them view permission-seeking as a part of 
the traditional Bangladesh culture. A small proportion of women also behold that their own 




If not gender description whether restrictions are correlates of family  





Relates to Family 
Empowerment 
Permission-Seeking 
is Part of Tradition 
and Culture 
Restrictions Are Out of 
Affection and Concern 
for My Own Welfare 
Others 
Unemployed (67)   7.46 37.31 50.75 17.95 
Employed (214)   9.35 42.99 75.70 10.28 
Self-employed (26) 11.54 26.92 69.23 26.92 
Low-skill (83)   3.61 38.55 83.13   3.61 
Medium-skill (61) 14.75 54.10 72.13 11.48 
High-skill (44) 11.36 45.45 70.45 11.38 
Overall (281)   8.90 41.63 69.75 12.10 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
 
7. Discrimination at Workplace 
About one in every eight working women reports that they earn less than their male 
colleagues for the same amount of work (see table 10). The existence of earnings inequality is 
the highest with the self-employed women followed by the high-skilled category, and the 
lowest with the unskilled category. The incidence of harassment is the highest with the low-
skill women. About one-fourth of the low-skill women indicate that they are harassed either 
by the employers or their male colleagues or both. Overall, one in every five employed 
women becomes a target of harassment at the workplace.  
 
Table 10 
Earnings inequality and workplace harassment by job category (%) 
Earnings Inequality Occurrence of Harassment  
Job Category Yes No Yes No 
Self-Employed (47) 21.28 78.72 ..... ..... 
Low-Skill (124)   6.45 93.54 24.19 75.81 
Medium-Skill (96) 13.55 86.45 19.79 80.21 
High-Skill (77) 16.88 83.12 18.18 81.82 
Overall (344) 12.79 87.21 21.21 78.79 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
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 Table 11: 
Sources of harassment at the workplace by job category (%) 




Employer Male Colleagues Yes No 
Low-Skill (30) 93.33 23.33 57.14 42.86 
Medium-Skill (19) 78.95 68.42 66.67 33.33 
High-Skill (14) 78.57 21.43 45.45 54.55 
Overall (63) 85.71 31.75 57.41 42.59 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
 
Of the sufferers, 85.71 per cent indicate that the smears come from the employers (see table 
11). Although the male colleagues feature in less number of cases, the figure is still 
alarmingly high. About 32 per cent of those who were subject to any harassment suffered it 
from the fellow male colleagues. Furthermore, about 57 per cent of the sufferers suggest that 
they are more frequently harassed than their male counterparts by the employers. 
 
8. Status and Welfare of Women 
Women regard their ability to earn income as a defining factor in relation to their status in the 
family, among relatives, and the society at large. Unemployed women and employed women 
were asked separate questions to provide their opinions on this issue by comparing their 
position relative to the other group. Employed women were asked if, as a result of their being 
in the labour force, they enjoyed better status compared to the unemployed women. The 
unemployed women, on the other hand, were asked to comment if they would have enjoyed a 
better status had they been members of the labour force. As presented in table 12, an 
overwhelming majority of both employed and unemployed women responded in the 
affirmative and that there is virtually no difference between the opinions of the two groups.  
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 Table 12: 
Women’s perception on whether workforce participation raises their status in the 
family, among their relatives and in the community by status of employment (%) 
Status in Family Status Among Relatives Status in Society  
Employment 
Status 
Yes No Not 
Sure 
Yes No Not 
Sure 
Yes No Not 
Sure 
Unemployed (112) 88.39   7.14  4.46 89.29   6.25   4.46 87.50   5.36   7.14 
Employed (344) 88.37   6.40   5.23 84.30 10.47 5.23 86.05   8.72   5.23 
Self-Employed (47) 87.23 10.64   2.13 80.85 17.02   2.13 82.98 14.89   2.13 
Low-skill (124) 93.55   3.23   3.23 88.71   8.06   3.23 88.71   8.06   3.23 
Medium-skill (96) 85.42   7.29   7.29 82.29   9.38   8.33 85.42   7.29   7.29 
High-skill (77) 84.42   7.79   7.79 81.81 11.69   6.49 84.42   7.79   7.79 
Overall (456) 88.38   6.58   5.04 85.53   9.42   5.04 86.40   7.89   5.70 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
  
The above also holds on a broader perspective. The respondents were asked to comment 
whether, based on their experience and observation, women’s workforce participation can 
foster women’s own status and welfare as well as the welfare of their family, which in turn 
raises the status of the family in the society. Almost every respondent believe that their own 
welfare as well as family welfare is positively correlated (see table 13). 
 
Table 13: 
Workforce participation and the status and welfare of women themselves  
and their families by status of employment (%) 
Own Status and Welfare Family’s Status and Welfare  
Employment Status Yes No Yes No 
Unemployed (112) 100.00   0.00 99.11   0.89 
Employed (344)   97.67   2.33 97.38   2.62 
Self-Employed (47) 95.74   4.26 95.74   4.26 
Low-skill (124) 98.39   1.61 97.58   2.42 
Medium-skill (96) 97.92   2.08 96.88   3.12 
High-skill (77) 97.40   2.60 98.70   1.20 
Overall (456) 98.25   1.75 97.81   2.19 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
 
In the context of Bangladesh, separation or divorce between married couples are mostly 
initiated by the male partners. Besides cultural and religious considerations, it is the financial 
dependence of women on men that reduces women’s ability to enforce a decision as and 
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when they desire so. Other factors remaining the same, a working woman therefore is more 
likely to be able to effect a divorce decision than a non-working woman. Tables 14 to 16 
describe the survey results on the relative positions of the married women. About 34 per cent 
of the working married women suggest that they are more likely to be able to divorce 
husbands compared with a non-working woman (see table 14). About the same proportion of 
the respondents (just over 36 per cent) answered in the negative with the rest being not sure. 
On the other hand, a smaller percentage (24.48 per cent) of the working married women 
believe that they are more likely to be in a position now to take a divorce decision than if they 
were not working, while 39 per cent of them hold the opposite view. However, in both cases, 
the middle- and high-skill categories appear to be more empowered than the rest, especially 
the low-skill women. This suggests that the degree of financial independence of women is 
positively related to their ability to take decisions on separation or divorce.  
 
Table 14: 
Divorce to husband more likely by working women than by non-working women or in 
comparison with their hypothetical position of not being in the labor force (%) 
More Able to Divorce Husband as 
Compared with Non-working 
Women 
More Able to Divorce Husband 




Yes No Not Sure Yes No Not Sure 
Self-Employed (44) 29.55 36.36 34.09 20.45 38.64 40.91 
Low-skill (74) 22.97 47.50 29.73 13.51 55.41 31.08 
Medium-skill (61) 32.79 34.43 32.79 24.59 34.43 40.98 
High-skill (62) 51.62 24.19 24.19 40.32 24.19 35.48 
Overall (241) 34.02 36.09 28.88 24.48 39.00 36.51 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
 
The responses from the non-working women suggest even a stronger relationship between 
women’s workforce participation and their ability to divorce their husbands. As shown in 
table 15, about 41 per cent of the surveyed unemployed married women believe that they are 
less likely to divorce their husbands than the working women while about 27 per cent of them 




Divorce to husband less likely by non-working women than by working women or in 
comparison with their hypothetical position of being in the labor force 
Attribute Yes No Not Sure 
Less Able to Divorce Husband as Compared with Working Women 41.07 26.79 32.14 
Less Able to Divorce Husband Now than if Working 26.78 25.00 48.21 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: No. of observations = 112. 
 
A woman’s workforce participation also appears have a strong negative influence on her 
husband’s decision to implement a separation or divorce. More than 40 per cent of all 
working women and about 48 per cent of the high-skill women assert that their husbands are 
less likely to go for a divorce now than if they (women) were unemployed (see table 16). 
Similarly, about 37 per cent of the non-working women believe that they are more likely to 
be divorced by their husbands now than if they were working (not reported in the table). 
 
Table 16: 
Husband less likely to divorce a working wife if the wife was not working 
Job Category Yes No Not Sure 
Self-Employed (44) 31.82 31.82 36.36 
Low-Skill (74) 40.54 37.84 21.62 
Medium-Skill (61) 37.70 27.87 34.43 
High-Skill (62) 48.39 20.97 30.65 
Overall (241) 40.25 29.88 29.88 
Source: Field survey. 
Note: As in Table 2. 
 
 
9. Alternative Assessments 
This section applies the non-parametric chi-square test as well as the logistic regression 
technique to verify the results on selected issues outlined in the preceding sections. The 
estimated chi-square test statistics are presented in table 17. A comparison between 
unemployed and employed married women suggests that statistically significant differences 
exist in respect of independent decisions on fertility, both independent and overall 
participation in decisions on children’s healthcare, possession of assets, permission-seeking 
for outside activities and incidence of domestic violence. Significant differences also exist 
regarding women’s opinions on the removal of family restrictions and on whether restrictions 
are out of affection and concern for women’s own welfare. The chi-square test does not 
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support the existence of differences with regard to the overall participation in fertility 
decisions, decisions on children’s education, membership of formal organisations, and 
women’s views on gender discrimination, the association between women’s own welfare and 
family welfare and whether seeking family permission is a part of traditional culture.  
 
Table 17: 
2χ Test statistics for comparisons between working and non-working married women 







Independent Decisions on Fertility   3.74 (1)* 0.60 (3) 
Total Participation in Fertility Decisions 2.50 (1) 0.37 (3) 
Independent Decision on Children’s Education 0.79 (1) 0.44 (3) 
Total Participation in Children’s Education Decisions 0.50 (1) 0.52 (3) 
Independent Decision on Children’s Healthcare   6.11 (1)* 2.50 (3) 
Overall Participation in Decisions on Children’s Healthcare 15.05 (1)* 0.66 (3) 
Possession of Assets 4.00 (1)* 16.53 (3)* 
Seek Family Permission for Outside Activities 4.89 (1)* 2.11 (3) 
Membership of Formal Organisation 2.50 (1) 2.98 (3) 
Incidence of Domestic Violence   5.86 (1)* 1.83 (3) 
If Restrictions on Movement a Kind of Gender Discrimination 2.17 (1) 6.07 (3) 
Removal of Restrictions   3.82 (1)* 6.35 (3)* 
Own Empowerment and Family Empowerment are Correlated 0.22 (1) 5.68 (3) 
Seeking Permission Part of Traditional Culture 0.68 (1) 6.59 (3)* 
Restrictions Are out of Affection and Concern for My Own Welfare 15.06 (1)* 4.16 (3) 
Selected Other Issues 
Possession of Assets between Working Married and Working Single 
Women 
….. 23.42 (1)* 
Independent Spending Decisions by Married Working Women ….. 2.48 (3) 
Overall Spending Decisions by Married Working Women ….. 5.68 (3) 
Independent Spending Decisions by Single (Working) Women ….. 2.19 (3) 
Overall Spending Decisions by Single (Working) Women ….. 1.05 (3) 
Spending Decision between Working Married and Working Single 
Women 
….. 11.35 (1)* 
Earnings Inequality ….. 8.71 (3)* 
Harassment at Workplace (excluding the self-employed category) ….. 1.20 (2) 
Harassment by Employers ….. 2.71 (2) 
Harassment by Male Colleagues ….. 13.46 (2)* 
Harassed More than Male Colleagues (by employers) ….. 1.17 (2) 
Divorce to Husband More Likely by a Working- than by a Non-
Working Woman (Working Married Women’s View) 
….. 13.01 (3)* 
Divorce to Husband More Likely by a Working Women Now than If 
Not Working 
….. 13.62 (3)* 
Divorce by Husband Lees Likely Now than If Not Working 
(Working Married Women’s View) 
….. 3.17 (3) 
Notes: (a) Figures in parentheses show the associated degrees of freedom. (b) An asterisk indicates that the null 
hypothesis of no difference in population proportions between relevant categories is rejected at the 10 per cent 




Comparisons among the categories of employed women indicate that there are statistically 
significant differences with respect to possession of assets, and women’s opinions on the 
removal of family restrictions as well as whether restrictions are beneficial to their own 
welfare. Significant differences also exist between working married and single women in 
terms of possession of assets and spending decisions. The chi-square test also suggests that 
women’s job category is an important factor in gender earnings inequality, harassment by 
male colleagues and women’s ability to divorce their husbands. Furthermore, ability to 
enforce a separation or divorce also differs between employed and unemployed women. 
 
While the chi-square test statistics are indicative of the potential differences in population 
proportions between relevant categories, they cannot be used to verify if the suggested results 
also hold in the presence of other explanatory variables. Further, the non-parametric tests also 
fail to ascertain the extent of the differences. We, therefore, estimate a set of logistic 
regression equations, a preferred estimation technique in the literature for qualitative 
dependent variables. The set of explanatory variables include women’s education, religion, 
age, husband’s employment status, and the place of living alongside women’s employment 
status.2 The parameter estimates are presented in table 18, which suggest that in the presence 
of other pertinent explanatory variables women’s workforce participation has the expected 
and statistically significant impacts on overall participation in fertility decisions, possession 
of assets and family permission for outside activities. Interestingly, working women are more 





Logit Regression results of selected indicators of women’s empowerment in urban Bangladesh 
Dependent Variables   
Regressor DFR1 DFR2 DED1 DED2 DME1 DME2 ASST PERM MEM IVLC GDSC RRES RWEF RWEL TRAD 
Constant -3.96* -0.20 -3.35* -3.56* -2.29* -2.82* -3.13*  2.37* -3.36* -2.31* -2.18* -2.20* -4.62* -1.09  1.43* 
wfp  0.75  0.64*  0.12 -0.22  0.30 -0.04  0.78* -0.61*  0.36 -0.48  0.38  0.49  0.70  0.39  0.72* 
edu -0.12  0.10* -0.05  0.05*  0.11* -0.03  0.16* -0.07*  0.10* -1.12*  0.07*  0.10*  0.02 -0.03 -0.08* 
rlg  0.64  0.03 -0.84* -0.11 -0.50  0.17  -0.27 -0.01  0.13  0.06  0.44  0.18  0.65 -0.30  0.10 
age  0.01  0.00  0.06*  0.12*  0.06*  0.13*  0.04* -0.02  0.02  0.21 -0.00  -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
hwfp  0.71  0.55 -0.04  0.26 -0.45 -0.37  -0.54  0.37 -0.00  0.72 -0.54 -0.64*  1.11  0.93 -0.01 
ctyd  1.04* -0.28 -0.15 -0.14  0.21  0.33  0.95* -0.98* -0.46  0.98*  0.34  0.33* -0.24 -0.73*  -1.54* 
N 353 353 182 182 289 289 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 
χ2 10.88* 20.47* 9.54 65.37* 27.59* 59.40* 84.89* 41.42* 18.22
* 
29.77 14.12* 21.76* 4.51 16.86* 69.84* 
Pseudo R2 .053 .059 .054 .137 .091 .132 .177 .085 .056 .093 .037 .056 .027 .041 .147 
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient or statistic is significant at the 10 percent level of significance or less. 
Variable Descriptions: 
DFR1 independent decision on fertility        DFR2 joint decision on fertility  
DED1 independent decision on children’s education      DED2 joint decision of children’s education  
DMD1 independent decision of children’s medical treatment      MD2 joint decision of children’s medical treatment  
ASST possession of assets by women       PERM permission for activities outside home  
MEM membership of formal organisations      IVLC incidence of domestic violence 
GDSC gender discrimination        RRES removal of restrictions 
RWEF women’s empowerment and family empowerment are related    RAD seeking permission is part of traditional culture  
RWEL restrictions are out of affection and concern of welfare    wfp women’s workforce participation (dummy) 
edu women’s education (no. of years)       rlg religion dummy (Muslim = 1; Non-Muslim = 0) 
age age of the respondent        hwfp husband’s workforce participation (dummy) 
ctyd regional dummy (Dhaka =1; Chittagong =0) 
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Women’s level of education seems to be a far more important variable than women’s 
workforce participation in explaining their empowerment and welfare as the former turns out 
to be statistically significant in more equations than the latter including the equations for the 
decisions on children’s education and healthcare as well as the incidence of domestic 
violence. Religion has been found to be significant only in the case of independent decisions 
on children’s education, which suggests that a Muslim woman is less involved in decisions 
on children’s education than a non-Muslim woman. Women’s participation in decisions on 
children’s education and healthcare as well as their possession of assets are positively related 
to age. Husband’s workforce participation does not have an impact on women’s participation 
in family decisions. Women living in Dhaka vis-à-vis those living in Chittagong are more 
likely to be involved in independent decisions on fertility and have possession of assets and 
less likely to seek permission for outside activities. They are also more likely to advocate for 
a removal of the family restrictions as they are less likely to view that family restrictions are 
out of affection and concern for their welfare or that the restrictions are part of traditional 
culture and custom. Interestingly, women in Dhaka are more likely to become victims of 
domestic violence than women in Chittagong. 
 
In order to see if women’s job category has an impact on their status, we re-estimate the 
equations in table 18 by replacing the wfp variable by the four job category variables namely, 
sempl (self-employment), lsk (low-skill job), msk (medium-skill job) and hsk (high-skill job) 
with unemployment being the reference. Husband’s employment status, hwfp, is also replaced 
by the job category variables. The rest of the explanatory variables remain the same. The 
estimated regression results of the extended models are presented in table 19. The results 
suggest that women’s job categories especially the medium- and high-skill jobs do indeed 
make a difference. Like workforce participation, husband’s job category also does not have 
any implications for women’s participation in family decisions which, however, has 
implications for women’s opinions on gender discrimination and removal of restrictions (for 
the self-employed and low-skill categories). The rest of the explanatory variables have almost 





Logit Regression results of the extended models 
Dependent Variables  
Regressor DFR1 DFR2 DED1 DED2 DME1 DME2 ASST PERM MEM IVLC GDSC RRES RWEF RWEL TRAD 
Constant -4.12* -0.52 -4.03* -3.75* -3.05* -3.72* -2.81*  2.13* -3.57* -2.25* -1.90* -1.87* -3.53*  0.04  1.56* 
sempl  0.02  -0.30  0.42  0.28  0.63 -0.22 -0.52  0.58  0.01 -1.54*  0.73*  0.93* -1.26  0.36 -0.36 
lsk  1.23  0.75  0.32 -0.57  0.67  0.82*  .41 -0.50  0.33 -0.25  0.10  0.18 -0.81 -1.23*  0.34 
msk  1.32*  1.08*  1.38*  0.04  1.11*  0.61*  0.61* -0.79*  1.40*  -0.49  -0.83  0.23  0.71 -0.07  0.77* 
hsk  1.64*  1.31*  0.53 -0.53  0.48  0.20*  0.10 -1.01*  0.93* -0.90*  0.11 -0.15  0.34 -0.31  0.18 
edu -0.03  0.01* -0.03  0.04*  0.09* -0.01  0.15*  0.06*  .10* -0.72*  0.06*  0.10*  0.13 -0.03 -0.08* 
rlg -0.74 -0.04 -0.82* -0.06 -0.50  0.19 -0.34 -0.08  0.10 -0.12*  0.38  0.12  0.69 -0.33  0.05 
age  0.01  0.01    0.06  0.12*  0.07*  0.13*  0.04*  -0.19  0.02  0.18 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
hempl  1.04  0.23  0.15  0.72 -0.22  0.31 -0.42 -0.13 -0.44 0.93 -0.93* -1.11*  1.23  0.52 -0.19 
hlsk  0.12  0.75  0.30  0.56 -0.06 -0.09 -0.37  0.80 0.02  .48 -0.76 -0.99*  0.60  0.75 -0.06 
hmsk  0.56  0.18 -0.37  0.01 -0.79 -0.70 -0.13  0.68 -0.37  0.77   -0.44  -0.65  0.35  0.63 -0.30 
hhsk  0.66  0.16 -0.75 -0.06 -0.80 -0.10 -0.25  0.74 -0.32  1.19   -0.44  -0.59  0.53  0.26 -0.36 
ctyd  1.17*  0.01 -0.09 -0.32  0.32  0.44 1.11* -0.99* -0.32  0.96*    0.29   .25* -0.37 -1.00* -1.41* 
N 353 353 182 182 289 289 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 
LL -92.5 -159.4 -78.9 -201.1 -131.5 -189.5 -198.8 -217.1 -147.1 -139.1 -183.3 -180.2 -80.24 -190.3 -203.5 
χ2 20.22* 29.94* 17.64 74.39* 39.04* 72.24* 82.53* 51.99* 30.86* 40.50 18.42 29.30* 9.60 26.41* 69.62* 
Pseudo R2 .098 .086 .101 .156 .129 .160 .172 .107 .095 .1273 .048 .075 .056 .065 .146 
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient or statistic is significant at the 10 percent level of significance or less. 
Variable Descriptions: As in Table A.2 plus the following  
sempl - wife’s occupation dummy: self-employed lsk - wife’s occupation dummy: low-skill job msk - wife’s occupation dummy: medium-skill job 
Hsk - wife’s occupation dummy: high-skill job hempl - husband’s occupation dummy: self-employed hlsk - husband’s occupation dummy: low-skill job 
Hmsk - husband’s occupation dummy: medium-skill job hhsk - husband’s occupation dummy: high-skill job inac - wife’s occupation dummy: unemployed (reference group) 
Hinac - husband’s occupation dummy: unemployed (reference group)   
10. Concluding Comments 
This paper has examined and analysed the relationship between women’s workforce 
participation and various direct indicators of women’s empowerment and welfare on the basis 
of micro-level data from urban Bangladesh. The assessment is carried out by first generically 
comparing the position of the working women relative to the non-working women and then 
by verifying some of these implications through applications of appropriate statistical tools. 
The generic appraisal suggests that working women have greater autonomy in family 
decisions on fertility, children’s education and medical treatment relative to the non-working 
women. Working women also are more likely to possess and have control over resources, 
enjoy grater freedom of movement, involve more in group activities and are less likely to be 
the victims of domestic violence than the non-working women. Further, compared to single 
women, the married working women are more likely to be in possession and control of 
resources. In all the cases above, the level of skill or earnings appears to make a difference. 
On the issue of family restrictions, a higher proportion of working women consider them as 
gender discrimination and therefore would like to see them removed than the non-working 
women. However, majority of both working and non-working women do not consider 
restrictions on movement as gender discrimination, of which an overwhelming majority 
regard the restrictions as manifestation of affection from the elders and concern for their 
welfare. But only a small proportion of women consider their own empowerment and family 
empowerment to be positively correlated. Interestingly, a greater proportion of the working 
women than the non-working women who do not consider family restrictions as gender 
discrimination hold that seeking permissions from the elders is part of the traditions and 
culture, and that they are out of affection and concern for their welfare. 
 
The evidence also suggests the existence of gender wage-differentials, which appear to be 
positively correlated with skills. On the other hand, workplace harassment, which mainly 
comes from the employers as opposed to the male colleagues, is apparently highest for the 
unskilled workers. Both working and non-working women almost unanimously believe that 
work force participation is a determinant of women’s status in the family and the greater 
society. Also, almost all of the respondents hold that women’s ability to earn incomes 
enhances the overall welfare of women themselves which has positive implications for the 
family’s welfare as well as the status of the family in the society. Furthermore, the degree of 
women’s financial independence appears to be positively related to their ability to take and 
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enforce a decision on separating from or divorcing their husbands. The opinions of the non-
working women further complement this view. 
 
The chi-square tests seem to support most of the above observations except for the cases of 
the overall participation in fertility decisions, decisions on children’s education, membership 
of formal organisations, views on gender discrimination, the association between women’s 
own welfare and family welfare and whether seeking family permission is a part of traditional 
culture. But when controlled for other variables, as the logistic regression results show, 
women’s workforce participation variable has the expected signs and statistically significant 
coefficients only in the equations for joint decisions on fertility, possession of assets and 
family permission for outside activities and unexpected sign but statistically significant 
coefficient in the equation for the family restrictions as part of the traditional culture. These 
findings thus contradict past empirics regarding the positive impacts of women’s workforce 
participation on their freedom of movement, incidence of domestic violence and children’s 
welfare (as indicated by women’s involvement in decisions on children’s education and 
healthcare). The results also accord well with empirical evidence from rural India which 
suggests that women working outside home do not seem to be empowered. Indeed the reverse 
may occur (Tisdell et al., 1999).  
 
On the other hand, education appears to have more positive implications for women’s 
empowerment and welfare. Of the other variables, age and place of living are important 
determinants while religion does make a difference only in the case of independent decisions 
on children’s education. The significance of the regional dummy variable suggests that the 
level of exposure to cultural diversity and awareness is important for women’s 
empowerment. It may be argued that the cultural and societal context in Chittagong is closer 
to tradition and customs than that in Dhaka. That religion is not an important factor 
explaining women’s empowerment does indeed negate the view that the purdah or seclusion 
is necessarily detrimental to women’s empowerment in Bangladesh. Further, while women’s 
job category is important, husband’s job category seems to be unrelated. To conclude, while 
women’s workforce participation may have positive impacts on women’s empowerment 
through participation in family decisions, this study highlights the fact that the importance of 
workforce participation may be grossly overestimated without controlling for the effects of 
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1. The survey for this study was undertaken in the two largest cities of Bangladesh 
namely, Dhaka and Chittagong between December 2003 and February 2004. A total 
of 456 respondents were interviewed using a structured questionnaire, of which 344 
were actively involved in income-generating activities outside home, including the 
self-employed and 112 were engaged in household activities only. Of the working 
women, 241 were married and 103 were single. The non-working women were all 
married. The database includes information from cross-sections of respondents with 
respect to education, age, religion, level of income, professions, and branch of activity 
such as low-, medium- or high-skill jobs. Self-employment, defined as income-
generating activities other than household works or wage-employment, has been 
considered as a separate category although it may have included activities that require 
certain level of skill such as the owner of a business enterprise or a physician who 
runs his own practice. This category has been separated from the skill-categories in 
order to differentiate between market and non-market employment.  
 
2. For further explanations of the explanatory and the dependent variables, see the 
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